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China’s integration into the global economy, while rapid, has been managed as part of a 
wider liberalization process. The structural changes in the rural economy arising from 
these twin processes have led to widening intra-rural inequalities. To address these, the 
central leadership has, in Polanyian manner, moved to counter some of the adverse effects 
of liberalization and globalization. We discuss this dynamic as it has affected rural China. 
We analyze results from a national data set covering the period 1991-2006 to assess the 
extent to which the state has been successful in protecting society from the advance of 
market forces. We find positive outcomes in terms of real earnings growth and poverty 
reduction but negative outcomes in terms of the rise in open unemployment and in terms 
of increasing intra-rural income inequality, although this was noticeably more 
pronounced in the 1991-2000 period than in the 2000-2006 period when more active 
government redistributive mechanisms were in place. 
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1. Introduction  
China’s rural economy has undergone radical change since the onset of economic 
reforms in 1978. In the 30 years since rural China has experienced successive waves of 
liberalization. The dismantling of the commune system in 1978 was only the opening, 
albeit dramatic, salvo in a continued and protracted extension of the market into the 
organization and coordination of the rural economy. The household responsibility system, 
which replaced the commune system, was followed by the expansion of off-farm rural 
industrial employment in Township and Village enterprises in the mid-1980s. These 
enterprises were rapidly privatized themselves in the mid-late 1990s. At the same time, 
rural-urban migration became a major feature of the Chinese economy as tens of millions 
of peasants moved around the country in search of work. Then, in 2001, China joined 
the WTO in a move which further opened the agricultural and rural economies to the 
forces and logic of global capitalism.  
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These changes enriched many peasant households but sparked resistance from 
others especially those dispossessed of their land as local governments reallocated land to 
more profitable industrial uses with little regard to those farming it (see Guo 2001). And 
yet, despite the extension of the market into every facet of rural life, it has not been a 
process which has been wholly spontaneous or unregulated. In fact, quite the contrary. 
The central government has made conscious efforts to manage the process of rural market 
liberalization over the past 30 years. The Chinese state, far more than in most developing 
countries, has sought to manage the path of liberalization and globalization so as to both 
take advantage of the market and to constrain its more negative dynamics (see Naughton 
2007; Qian 2003). The idea of ‘managing the market’ is, of course, a common theme in 
the analysis of East Asian developmental states (Wade 1990) where the practices of 
deliberately ‘getting prices wrong’ and strategic interventions are highlighted.   
In this paper, we argue that a Polanyian framework can be used fruitfully to 
explain the dynamics of government policy in rural China. We set out this framework in 
the next section and discuss rural change in China through this prism in detail in section 
3. We examine the ways in which liberalization and globalization have been introduced 
into China’s rural economy and survey the ways in which the central state has sought to 
manage these processes by policy interventions.  
We then analyze the outcomes of this dual process of liberalization and 
globalization on the one hand and government-sponsored amelioration efforts on the 
other in section 4. We focus on changing patterns of labour allocation in response to 
market expansion, rural incomes, and intra-rural income inequality. The data shows that 
the state has been successful in managing liberalization and globalization in such a way as 
to reduce poverty, raise average real incomes, and reduce inter-regional rural income 
inequalities. The evidence on inter-group income inequality, however, points to widening 
rural income gaps. We conclude that the biggest test of the leadership’s ability to manage 
globalization comes with the fallout from the current global recession. 
 
 
2. Karl Polanyi in China 
The path of liberalization and globalization in China has been heavily managed 
by the central state. The unleashing of market forces has been rapid and dramatic but has 
also been heavily influenced by the government policy of ‘economic reform’ which has set 
the parameters for market expansion. This has been the case not only for promoting the 
rapid development and intensification of market processes but also in attempts to control 
the outcomes of those processes. This ‘managing the market’ approach is suggestive of 
possible Polanyian processes at work. For this to be a plausible interpretation, a careful 
re-casting of Polanyi in the Chinese context would be required. The changes occurring 
over the past 30 years in rural China certainly qualify as being a ‘great transformation’ in 
their own right. The liberalization and globalization of the rural sector with the ever 
increasing roles of local, national and international markets have already been noted. But 
this expansion of the market has been used to facilitate the structural transformation of 
the Chinese countryside. That is, the rural economy has been transformed from a 
non-market self-sufficient sector to one increasingly reliant on wage labour, much of 
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which is employed in the industrial sector. The developmental transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy has transformed the rural sector with the creation 
of a rural-based waged labour which is employed in both rural and urban centres. The 
absorption of labour into local enterprises at the township and village levels as well as the 
mass migrations to the coastal cities for export-oriented employment have fundamentally 
changed the income sources and labour allocation patterns of households in rural China 
(Taylor, Rozelle and de Brauw 2003).  
This multi-dimensional transformation of rural China has been facilitated by the 
expansion of the market. And yet, while there has undoubtedly been a progressive 
increase in the scope and scale of the market, and this has been a consistent thrust of 
government policy over the past three decades, this has also been a process which has 
spawned some kind of ‘counter movement’. While there have been many instances of 
peasant protest and backlash, it would be far too much to suggest that there has been an 
organized civil society counter movement. Indeed, while local spontaneous protests and 
grievances have typically been addressed, any semblance of organized resistance – a 
‘counter movement’ from below – has been swiftly destroyed. 
 But the constraining of markets can come from many sources and not just from 
civil society, from below. Munck (2006: 176) also reminds us that a ‘counter movement’ 
can also come from above, from ‘enlightened managers of capitalism’ or from ‘reactionary 
backward-looking forces’. Munck (2006: 180) continues by applying the Polanyian 
framework to those advocating a social democratic form of globalization, to ‘the 
managers of the newly globalized capitalism [who] sought to create a degree of 
sustainability for the machine they had created’ by regulating the unbridled form of 
globalization. Munck (2006: 184) approvingly quotes Evans that ‘elites, no less than the 
rest of us, need to resolve the Polanyi problem’. 
This clarification of Polanyi’s message opens up new ways of interpreting changes 
in the Chinese countryside. It suggests dialectic at work between the policy thrust to 
sequentially liberalize the rural sector and integrate it into the global economy as well as a 
desire to manage this process to protect society – and maintain social stability – against 
the worst excesses of an unregulated market. In China, with civil society effectively 
suppressed and confined to numerous but uncoordinated acts of local protest and 
resistance, the main agents in this dialectic are state elites themselves as both using the 
institution of the state to promote the extension of the market and to seek to regulate its 
workings – to ‘create a degree of sustainability for the machine they had created’ – and 
outcomes. Of course, the Chinese state operates at multiple levels but, as a first mapping 
of this process, we focus here primarily on the policies of the central state. Here the 
rhetoric of the ‘harmonious society’ promoted by the current leadership under Hu Jintao 
speaks directly to the need to ensure the social stability and sustainability of the reformed 
economy, making use of the market where possible but intervening to ensure equitable 
outcomes where necessary. It is this type of elite-driven Polanyian process that 
characterizes the Chinese leadership’s outlook, especially under the new leadership. 
This interpretive framework has been explicitly used to examine China’s reform 
path by Wang (2008). He argues (2008: 18) that in the reform period ‘the Chinese moral 
economy was transformed into a market society’ from 1979 to 1999 with market society 
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emerging as the ‘dominating factor’ by the end of this period. The problems associated 
with market domination, including ‘increasing social polarization between rich and poor 
(e.g. regional disparities, urban/rural divide, inequality within urban China, and 
inequality within the countryside)’ required a change in policy and led to a ‘protective 
countermovement to re-embed the economy into the society.’ (ibid. 21) He argues that 
this countermovement can be dated back to 1999 although ‘most social policies were 
introduced after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took office in 2002’ (ibid: 22) with 
‘protective legislation and other interventions [as] the characteristics of this 
countermovement’ (ibid: 47). Wang provides examples in both urban and rural areas of 
policies which have been introduced to reduce inequality and to provide social security. 
In this way, he argues that China has moved from the initial reform period concentration 
on ‘economic policies’ to one now which concentrates on ‘social policies’. 
We find Wang’s basic argument instructive and consider in more detail its 
application to the rural economy in the next section. In so doing, we argue that the 
temporal division suggested by Wang (i.e. reforms prior to 1999 and afterwards) has 
some traction but that the division he presents is too stark. In particular, the period since 
the turn of the millennium has been one in which it is true that social protections have 
increased but it also one in which the expansion of the market has intensified with WTO 
accession. That is, the latter period has been one in which both market expansion and 
countermovement have been promoted by government policy rather than one in which 
there has been a simple switch from one to the other. The outcomes of this dynamic are 
discussed in section 4.  
 
 
3. Reforming China’s Rural Economy: Liberalization, Globalization and 
Social Protection        
      Prior to 1978, nearly three quarters of the Chinese population lived in rural areas 
and most of the rural residents were primarily engaged in agricultural production. Rural 
income was low with the majority of the rural population living below a dollar a day 
poverty line. Despite low levels of absolute income, the social protections offered by the 
commune system were extensive through the ‘iron rice bowl’. The commune system also 
emphasized self-sufficiency over trade and so internal markets were poorly developed. 
This was the case for goods and for factors of production; with respect to labour, the 
household registration system (hukou) clearly separated rural from urban workers, a 
characteristic of a long-standing and enduring ‘urban bias’ in China’s policy formation, 
and intra-rural labour mobility was also highly constrained (Cheng and Selden 1994). 
The role of the market in rural China was, therefore, strictly limited and subservient to 
the political logic of Maoist planning. However, this socialist legacy did mean that the 
subsequent expansion of the market took place against a backdrop of assets such as land 
and education being relatively equally distributed by developing country standards (Lardy 
1983). 
 The economic reforms that began in 1978 were initially focused on agriculture 
with the liberalization of prices and a greater role for the market in allocating and 
rewarding labour, and consequent eroding and abolition of the previous 
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commune-provided social protections, the main policy thrusts. The main policy objective 
in promoting the expansion of the market as the primary labour allocation mechanism 
has been to facilitate the transfer of surplus out of the agricultural sector and into higher 
productivity industrial wage labour, thereby moving the rural economy towards fuller 
employment and higher earnings.  
 The first step was the implementation of the household responsibility system 
which significantly improved the work incentives of farmers and generated 
unprecedented growth in agricultural production and farm incomes between 1978 and 
1984 (Lin 1987). Households were given limited use rights to land in return for fulfilling 
grain quotas. Output above this quota could be sold on free markets and led farmers to 
diversify into higher value crops. The success, in terms of income and output growth, of 
the liberalization of agricultural markets in the first five years of the reform program 
served as a model for the introduction of ‘managerial responsibility systems’ and the dual 
track pricing system into the urban, industrial sector in the mid-1980s. The reform and 
growth of the industrial system has been the focus of much international attention since 
but the rural economy has continued to be transformed and has remained an important 
area of policy reform for the Chinese leadership.     
 After the initial post-1978 boost in production, agricultural growth slowed but 
has still maintained a respectable average rate of output growth of 5.8 percent per year in 
years since 1984. Since the early-1980s, however, off-farm work has emerged as a main 
source of income growth for many rural households (Lohmar 1999; Kung 2002). From 
1985 to the early 1990s, township and village enterprises (TVEs) grew rapidly, providing 
jobs for nearly 120 million rural workers (Weitzman and Xu 1994; Bowles and Dong 
1994). This marked the first large structural transformation of the rural economy as 
farmers were transferred from agricultural to industrial work within their home towns 
and average incomes rose as a result.  
 Since the early 1990s, rural-urban migration has become the most common way 
for rural labourers to get a job off the farm (de Brauw et al 2002). It is estimated that in 
1994 and 1995, about 80 million migrant workers went to the cities, a number which 
roughly doubled over the following decade. Consistent with the experience of industrial 
countries, this second large structural transformation which moved labourers from 
agricultural to non-agricultural activities and rapidly increased rural-urban migration, 
fueled sharp rises in labour productivity and income in China’s rural sector. As a result, 
the proportion of the rural population living below the dollar a day poverty line fell 
sharply, from 65 percent in 1981 to 12.5 percent in 2001 (Ravallion 2006).   
While the transformation of China’s rural economy is indisputable, there remain 
many challenges which government policy has sought to address. Farm size is small and 
agricultural productivity remains low. There have therefore been attempts, from the late 
1990s onwards, at agricultural ‘modernization’ which have sought to increase production 
scale mainly though the government promotion of so-called ‘dragon head’ agribusinesses 
which supply urban markets through large scale rurally-located agribusiness operations 
(in poultry, livestock and food processing). Government policy seeks not only to expand 
the market but to shape the forms that it takes. Zhang and Donaldson (2008) document 
how these enterprises have led to the development of agrarian capitalism with the rise of 
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waged labour but conditioned by continuing strong norms of collective land rights which 
have led to a distinctive, and more egalitarian, form of agrarian capitalism than found in 
other developing countries.   
The development of rural industry, however, has been unbalanced and 
concentrated in coastal regions with the less developed western regions experiencing great 
difficulty generating off-farm employment with the result that inter-regional inequalities 
were exacerbated (Cai, Wang and Du 2002). Moreover, while restrictions on labour 
movement were relaxed, the hukou system still deprived rural migrant workers of equal 
access to employment, health care and education. All of these problems were evident in 
the 1990s and the economic slowdown following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
created additional hurdles for rural economic structural change. In the face of rising 
urban unemployment, rural migrants found it hard to find jobs in the cities and a large 
number of migrants returned to the countryside (Zhao 2002). In the countryside, many 
TVEs went bankrupt, forcing workers to return to agricultural production. Thus, the 
growth of rural income decelerated, the gap between rural and urban incomes increased, 
and progress in poverty reduction came to a standstill in the mid-1990s (Sicular et al 
2007; Ravallion and Chen 2004).      
Against this backdrop, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 marked a further stage in the transformation of the rural economy. This time the 
transformation was spurred not just by domestic market expansion but by greater 
exposure to international market forces as well. This intensification of market pressures 
might be expected to further enhance the role of the market in allocating labour and 
hastening the transfer of surplus labour into non-agricultural activities (Sicular and Zhao 
2004). 
WTO accession also committed China to opening up its domestic agricultural 
markets to foreign competition and reducing subsidies to agriculture, raising the fear that 
it might further hinder income growth for rural households and exacerbate inter-regional 
and rural-urban income disparity (Fewsmith 2001; Blum 2002). This outcome would be 
expected from analyses of globalization which argue that the employment and income 
gains from trade liberalization in developing countries are captured disproportionately by 
the already better-off groups, with negative implications for inequality and for the poor 
(Cornia 1999).1 The exact impact, however, is difficult to predict since, as Rodrik (2001) 
for example argues, the distributional outcome of globalization depends upon country 
specific conditions. Included here are the preexisting distribution of assets and access to 
public goods. A more equal distribution of land, capital, human capital, and access to 
human and physical infrastructures allows broader participation in the opportunities 
created by greater openness to external trade. Secondly, it depends on the flexibility of 
domestic markets, especially for labour. Market barriers hinder the household’s ability to 
cope with negative shocks and may consequently translate trade shocks into actual 
poverty.  Thirdly, and most importantly, it depends on how effective public policies are 
in response to the adjustment associated with trade liberalization. Gains from trade 
liberalization are more likely to be shared equally in countries which use trade reforms to 
advance the domestic development agenda.                                 
These observations are relevant to the implications of China’s accession to the 
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WTO for the employment and income of rural households. The favorable initial 
conditions, in terms of a relatively equal asset distribution, would potentially permit the 
gains from greater specialization associated with WTO accession to be shared more 
broadly compared with the gains from similar liberalization in other countries. However, 
China’s labour markets have historically been inflexible and highly segmented. As noted 
above, the household residential registration system impeded the free circulation of 
labour and kept rural residents from migrating into cities for many decades and while 
these flows have now increased dramatically they occur within the context of continued 
forms of exclusion for migrant workers. As a result, the share of farm employment and 
the share of the rural population in China are relatively high compared to other countries 
at a similar level of development. There are also large disparities in access to human and 
physical infrastructures between the coastal and the western regions (Wan and Zhou 
2005).   
China’s WTO membership was predicted to reduce the prices of crops that use 
land intensively, such as wheat, corn and soybeans, but increase the prices of crops and 
manufactured goods that use labour intensively.2 The changes in relative prices of crops 
and goods would lead to labour reallocation between sectors. However, with labour 
market barriers and poor infrastructure and a shortage of human capital in China’s less 
developed interior regions, it would be difficult for farmers to switch from grain 
production to other high value-added crops or to non-farm activities. The difficulty in 
switching between activities would, ceteris paribus, contribute to rising income inequality 
among households and between regions and worsening rural poverty. Even commentators 
in favour of greater liberalization through WTO accession accepted the problems that 
this would likely create problems for the agricultural sector (Lin 2000).  
The legacy of inter-regional inequalities and rural-urban disparities which 
resulted from the liberalization policies of the 1990s were threatened with being further 
exacerbated by exposure to global market forces in the 2000s through WTO membership. 
The commitment to expanding market forces and allocation mechanisms in the rural 
economy is common to both periods but, since the early 2000s, the further integration of 
the rural economy into the global market has brought forth responses from the central 
leadership attempting to manage this integration to counter the potential adverse effects 
on rural labour. That is, while the leadership has sanctioned and championed the 
extension of the market in the rural economy, it has also sought to manage this by 
securing distributional outcomes which will maintain social stability. A partial, limited 
and elite-driven (Polanyian) attempt to counter the unfettered market’s potentially 
destabilizing effects is evident.  
The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party (CPC) in 2002 announced 
that one of the main goals of the next decade was to the increase income of rural 
households, continue to shift massive amounts of labour out of farming as a way of doing 
this, and ensure a more balanced growth between city and countryside and between the 
east and west regions. This formed part of the leadership’s attempts to promote 
development based on a ‘harmonious society’. Rhetoric aside, the aim was clearly to 
manage the distributional outcomes of further market liberalization and globalization to 
maintain social stability. 
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 The increased importance accorded to addressing the rural economy and to 
managing the impact of further liberalization and globalization is reflected in ‘Number 1’ 
policy documents (yihaowenjian). This document is the first policy document the 
Chinese government issues each year and indicates the policy priority for that year. Since 
1978 the central government has issued eight ‘Number 1’ policy documents concerning 
rural development, five of which were issued in the early reform period from 1982 to 
1986. The remaining three, however, were all issued after WTO entry in 2004, 2005 and 
2006. For these three consecutive years, rural development was placed as the central 
government’s highest priority. All three of the recent policy documents intended to 
address problems concerning agriculture, farmers, and rural areas (‘sannong wenti-nongye, 
nong min and nongchun’).  
 The three Number 1 documents from the 2000s stipulate that governments at 
all levels adopt measures to raise rural income and reduce rural-urban income 
disparities.  Included in the policy initiatives are: providing subsidies for grain 
production; reducing (and eventually abolishing) agricultural tax and rural levies; 
increasing off-farm employment and urban-rural migration; increasing infrastructural 
investment; enforcing nine-year compulsory education; and developing rural social 
programs such as the ‘rural health cooperative scheme’ and rural pension program. This 
represents an extensive set of policy measures designed to both enable rural labour to 
engage in the market economy on better terms and to increase levels of social protection 
when they are unable to do so.3 We discuss some of these measures below: 
Reforming the household registration system to increase rural-urban migration. One 
important change has been the reforms in the household registration system, which 
allows rural people to work and live permanently in cities. Many large cities began to 
provide migrants’ children equal access to education. The Act of Household Registration 
(2004) provided a legal basis for a nationwide household registration system that treated 
all citizens equally and guaranteed their ability to migrate.4 This policy change is ‘market 
conforming’ rather than ‘market constraining’ but is nevertheless important in terms of 
seeking to address the conditions under which rural migrants enter urban labour markets.   
In order to encourage land improvement and output growth, land tenure policy 
quickly evolved to increase the security of use rights. By the mid-1980s, fifteen-year leases 
with frequent and minor redistributions had become the policy. In 1998, the contracts 
were extended to thirty years with infrequent redistributions; the 2003 policy prohibited 
reallocations altogether (People’s Daily 2003; Summerfield 2006). In industrialized 
countries, the process of creating an urban proletariat relied on ‘freeing’ the peasants from 
the land by removing their entitlements to land use. In China, the process has been 
accompanied by a more complex process of systemic change which has removed the rural 
‘iron rice bowl’ provided by the commune system and replaced it with forms of private 
land ownership – through use rights – which have been strengthened, rather than 
diminished, over time.5 Increasing farmers’ security of private use rights has therefore 
occurred at the same time as the massive reallocation of labour out of agriculture. 
Fees, taxes and subsidies. A widely reported drag on rural disposable income 
growth has been the extra burden of local fees and levies imposed on rural residents.  
Unlike in urban areas, where most of the public goods are funded by state or local 
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government budgets, rural residents below the township level are levied to finance their 
basic medical care, public schools, township-village-level administrations, and other 
public facilities. To reduce rural residents’ tax burdens and increase their incomes, in the 
Tenth Five-year Plan of National Economic and Social Development (2001-05), the 
government eliminated grain procurement quotas, removed various levies by village and 
township governments, committed to gradually phasing out taxes on all agricultural 
products, and, notwithstanding WTO commitments, provided subsidies to grain 
producers (which were as high as 40 yuan/mu in some localities).6 On January 1, 2006, 
the People’s Congress voted unanimously to terminate the Act of Rural Taxes and 
agricultural taxes in China, after millennia, became history. It is estimated that the rural 
tax and fees abolitions have increased household income by approximately 15 percent per 
year. Because rural levies and agricultural taxes were regressive in nature, the tax reform 
disproportionately benefited low-income households.7  
Increasing government spending on the rural sector. The Tenth Five-year Plan also 
called for a substantial increase in expenditures on agriculture and rural development by 
governments at all levels. In 2003, the central government increased its expenditures on 
agriculture by 20 percent, and most of the new spending was investment in rural 
infrastructure such as roads and bridges, and irrigation, drainage, and drinking water 
projects. From a nationally representative village survey, Zhang et al. (2006) find that 
between 1998 and 2003, there were 9,138 investment projects in the 2,459 villages 
surveyed, 3.75 projects per villages, that the majority of the projects were launched after 
2001 and that 87 percent of the projects were investment in public goods. Investment in 
villages in poor, inland regions appears to have occurred at a higher rate and grew faster 
than investment in richer villages. Zhang et al (2006) also find that three quarters of the 
projects in the poor provinces of Gansu and Shaanxi were subsidized by governments at 
higher levels, whereas subsidized projects accounted for only a quarter of the projects in 
richer Jiangsu. Nevertheless, national data do not show that agriculture has taken a larger 
share of total central government expenditure. In fact the share of agricultural 
expenditures in total government expenditure was 10 percent in 1990, 8.8 percent in 
1996, 7.8 percent in 2000, 7.2 percent in 2002, 8.2 percent in 2004 and falling back to 
7.2 percent in 2006.8 Despite rising real expenditures each year, the share of agriculture 
expenditure in total government expenditure still remains below 1990 level, casting some 
doubt on the impact of the rural sector’s increased importance on the allocation of central 
government resources. 
In 2003, the State Council announced the abolition of school charges and book fees in 
rural schools, making rural compulsory education free (see Knight 2008). Subsidies were 
made available for boarding students from low income households. Rural education 
spending by the central government increased to 82 billion yuan to match these 
commitments.   
To sum up, the security of the previously collectivized sector is now but a distant 
memory for residents in rural China. In its place has come a relentless wave of 
liberalization and now globalization, in the form of WTO accession; the market has 
consequently expanded its role in allocating labour and facilitating the transfer of labour 
from agricultural to non-agricultural activities, a process which has been the central 
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leadership’s main policy for raising rural incomes. However, as the inequalities arising 
from this process, combined with rising levels of economic insecurity intensified, the 
central leadership has also sought to manage the distributional consequences of the 
market-led reallocation of labour within the rural economy. These policies have 
intensified since the 2001 WTO accession, as indicated by the designation of rural 
development as a Number 1 policy, and have included policies on rural infrastructure 
spending, tax abolition, grain subsidies, tenure security and education policies. All have 
intended to mitigate the effects of market liberalization on the poorest and to equip them 
with the tools to participate in the new market-driven economy rather than be 
submerged beneath it. In the next section, we discuss the extent to which this objective 
has been realized.   
 
 
4. Trends in Labour Allocation, Income and Inequality 
The preceding discussion has provided an analysis of the rural economy which, in 
broad brush strokes, can be summarized as the consistent expansion of the market 
through liberalization, first domestically and then internationally through WTO 
accession, aimed at reallocating rural labour. In the latter part of the reform period, and 
coinciding with WTO entry, government policy also paid greater attention to the 
distributional consequences of market expansion. In this section, we examine the 
evidence and analyze the extent of labour reallocation and the trends in intra-rural 
inequality. 
We use data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).9 The 
advantage of this survey data is that it has been collected for the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 
1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006. Each survey is carried out over a three-day period, and 
covers about 3800 households and 14,000 individuals in both urban and rural areas from 
nine of China’s 30 provinces, namely, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, 
Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi (autonomous region). These provinces are 
geographically dispersed and contain both coastal and inland areas, and from the north 
and the south. The survey provides rich socioeconomic information on individuals, 
households and communities in the sample. In order to focus sharply on rural conditions 
and rural dynamics, we exclude villages in suburban areas and communities around the 
county centres. Our sample is strictly a rural sample and its coverage is therefore reduced 
to about 2,000 households in the villages from the nine provinces for the period from 
1991 to 2006.10 A typical household in our sample is poorer than its counterpart in the 
full survey.    
 The data from the survey demonstrate the extent to which the structural 
transformation of the rural economy has taken place over the past decade and half and its 
acceleration in the 2000s. Column 1 of Table 1 shows that in the early 1990s less than 12 
percent of rural households had no members engaged in agricultural activities; by 2006 
this has risen to just under 30 percent.11 Column 2 shows even more dramatically the 
extent to which agriculture has ceased to be the exclusive employment for rural 
households. In 1991 nearly three quarters of rural households had members who worked 
only on-farm. By 2006 this was the case for only 13 percent of households. This decline 
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was particularly dramatic after 2000 when the rural economy was further transformed by 
exposure to the logic of global market forces in the form of WTO accession – a change 
which made land-intensive farming less attractive and which led to a rapid rise in China’s 
labour-intensive manufacturing exports. As farm employment decreased, wage 
employment rose dramatically fuelled by rising levels of migration. By 2006 over 40 
percent of rural households had at least one member working as a migrant worker in an 
urban centre and over 80 percent of households had at least one member in waged 
employment (whether in rural agribusiness, rural industry or urban industry).  
 These patterns are also evident if we look, in Table 2, at the allocation of work 
hours by rural households.12 We see that the percentage of time spent in agricultural work 
was halved between 1991 and 2006, from 72.2 percent to 35 percent of household hours 
while wage employment expanded from less than 20 percent of household labour hours 
to over 50 percent.  
 
 
Table 1 Labour force allocation over activities in rural China (%)  




   (2) 
Non-farm self 
employment 
       (3) 
Waged  
labour 
   (4) 
Migration 
 
  (5) 
1991 88.52 73.23 9.72 18.88   ---- 
1993 84.92 69.33 10.31 20.98   ---- 
1997 83.25 69.23 11.95 19.77 16.5 
2000 78.26 61.55 13.91 25.74 24.8 
2004 76.35 21.36 15.76 75.56 34.8 
2006 70.07 13.19 15.06 84.21 41.2 
Source: CHNS  
Notes: (1)-(4) present proportion of rural population aged between 16 and 64 engaged in the respective 
activity and (5) presents proportion of the rural households which have at least one member living and 


















 hours % hours % hours % hours 
1991 3,018 72.2 347 8.3 817 19.5 4,181 1,758
1993 2,402 66.0 395 10.9 841 23.1 3,638 1,646
1997 2,249 64.9 457 13.2 760 21.9 3,467 1,792
2000 1,722 54.6 498 15.8 933 29.6 3,154 1,903
2004 1,405 39.1 483 13.4 1,709 47.5 3,596 1,832
2006 1,205 35.0 444 12.9 1,797 52.1 3,447 1,836
Source: CHNS  
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 These labour reallocations have been a rational response by households to 
differential returns to the various forms of labour shown in Table 3. The dramatic shift of 
labour out of agriculture and into waged labour and, to a lesser extent, into 
self-employment, is rational given the much lower returns to farm labour than to 
employment in the other two activities. Even so, the return to agricultural labour has 
increased over time, especially after 2000, although the extent to which this is due to 
rising labour productivity, price effects and the outcome of physical investments in 
infrastructure in the sector cannot be determined from this data. 
 
 
Table 3 Rates of returns to farm labour, non-farm self employment and waged labour 
(yuan/hour)  
 Farm labour Non-farm 
self-employment
Waged labour No. 
observations  














2004-2006   0.415 
(0.073)*** 






Notes: Rates of returns are the OLS estimates of the respective labour hours of the household earnings 
function. Earnings are measured in 1991 constant price.  In the earnings function we control for average 
years of schooling and age of the labour force, land, assets, region and time. Heteroscadesticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.     




This reallocation of labour into higher return activities has been behind the 
growth of rural incomes over the survey period. In real terms, average household income 
in the survey has increased by 90 percent over the period 1991-2006.  However, within 
this, real earnings from farming have decreased while earnings from wage labour have 
risen substantially as Table 4 indicates. The higher rates of return offered in waged work 
in conjunction with the reallocation of labour into that sector has meant that wage 
income has gone from contributing just a fifth of total household earnings in 1991 to 
contributing three-fifths in 2006.  Noticeably, both earnings growth and structural 










 Table 4 Household annual earnings in rural China  
 Total 
earnings 
Farm income Non-farm self 
employment  
Wage income Earnings 
per 
worker  
 Yuan yuan % yuan % yuan % Yuan 
1991 3,477 2,461 70.8 281 8.1 735 21.2 1,465
1993 3,656 2,197 60.1 508 13.9 950 26.0 1,576
1997 4,176 2,382 57.0 531 12.7 1,263 30.2 1,826
2000 4,548 1,921 42.2 902 19.8 1,725 37.9 2,009
2004 6,022 2,004 33.3 590 9.8 3,428 56.9 3,174
2006 6,601 1,806 27.4 875 13.3 3,920 59.4 3,821
Average annual rate of growth  %  
1991-2000 3.0 -2.7 13.0  9.5  3.5
2000-2006 6.2 -1.0 -0.5  13.7  10.7
1991-2006 4.3 -2.1  7.6  11.2  6.4
Source: CHNS  
Note: Earnings are measured in 1991 constant price.   
  
This dramatic structural transformation of the rural economy has raised average 
real earnings as shown in Table 4. To investigate the income inequality trends around this 
rising average, we can consider measures such as the Gini coefficient. The Gini 
coefficients reported in Table 5 suggest very little change in earnings inequality over the 
period, a conclusion also supported by the Theil index. It is perhaps noteworthy that the 
dramatic structural transformation of the rural economy occurred without increasing 
earnings inequality but it is also the case that the rapid growth of wage labour might have 
been expected to reduce earnings disparities. 
  
Table 5 Earnings inequality in rural China  
Year 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 
Gini 
coefficient  0.480 0.459 0.438 0.476 0.434 0.461 
95% C.I. 0.447 0.436 0.424 0.448 0.414 0.431 
 0.513 0.481 0.453 0.504 0.454 0.491 
       
Theil 
index 0.508 0.387 0.337 0.438 0.342 0.427 
95% C.I.  0.412 0.329 0.304 0.339 0.284 0.331 
 0.603 0.445 0.370 0.536 0.399 0.524 
Source: CHNS 




To examine this point further, we decompose the Gini coefficient by earnings 
source. This indicates, as shown in Table 6, that inequality was indeed reduced by the 
spread of wage income over the period as earnings from this source became more widely 
accessible over time. Farm income that had been an equalizing factor became more 
unequally distributed while non-farm household income, typically derived from self 
employment in the retail and service sectors, remained very unequal and an income 
source available mainly to those rural households with considerable assets which they 
could invest in these activities. 
  
Table 6 Decomposition of Gini coefficient by sources of earnings in rural China   
   1991 1997 2000 2004 2006
Share of each earning component 
Total earnings   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Farm income  71.3 57.9 42.2 34.9 0.272
Non-farm household 
income 7.6 12.5 21.1 10.1 0.101
Wage incomes   21.1 29.6 36.7 55.0 0.575
Gini coefficient and concentration ratios  
Total  0.480 0.438 0.476 0.432 0.461
Farm income  0.550 0.509 0.513 0.623 0.620
Non-farm household 
income 0.916 0.916 0.920 0.923 0.923
Wage incomes   0.802 0.828 0.784 0.574 0.511
Contribution of each component to overall inequality  
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Farm income  67.0 41.3 21.0 27.6 19.2
Non-farm household 
income 8.8 17.0 17.0 15.7 26.4
Wage incomes   24.2 41.7 47.4 56.7 54.6
The effect of 1% increase in each component on inequality  
Farm income  -0.043 -0.166 -0.212 -0.073 -0.081
Non-farm household 
income 0.011 0.046 0.106 0.056 0.112
Wage incomes   0.032 0.120 0.106 0.018 -0.031
Source: CHNS  
Notes: Inequality indexes are calculated based on earnings per worker in 1991 constant price.   
  
 
The government policies discussed above, such as the central government   
infrastructure spending projects, were designed to increase rural productivity and to 
reduce inter-regional inequalities by being disproportionately targeted to the poorer 
provinces. As an indicator to gauge the success of this strategy, we report average earnings 
per worker by region in Table 7. 
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Table 7 Regional earnings disparity in rural China (yuan/worker)  
 Coast  North 
East 
 Central  West   
 (1) (2) (2)/(1)  (3) (3)/(1)   (4) (4)/(1) 
 
1991 2,269 1,591 0.701 1,262 0.556 929 0.409 
1997 2,302 1,842 0.800 1,824 0.792 1,391 0.604 
2000 2,665 2,237 0.839 1,591 0.597 1,717 0.644 
2006 4,182 3,762 0.900 4,138 0.990 3,241 0.775 
Source: CHNS  




   The results show that real earnings per worker were higher in rural areas in 
coastal provinces than in provinces in the other three regions. However, earnings per 
worker in the latter three regions all moved to convergence with the coastal provinces 
over the 15 year period. By the end of the period, earnings per worker in rural areas in 
the central region had reached parity with those in the coastal region, while those in the 
north-east had reached 90 percent of the coastal region’s value and the west over 77 
percent. Thus, rural inter-regional inequality declined significantly over the period with 
much of the decrease occurring after 2000.  
The Gini coefficient and its decomposition reported in Tables 5 and 6 provide 
insights into the changing dynamics of rural income inequality and its sources. However, 
as a summary measure, it does not provide evidence of what is happening in the tails of 
the income distribution, a matter of policy significance and important for any assessment 
of income trends. Furthermore, the data reported so far have analyzed how changing 
patterns of labour allocation have affected rural households’ earnings profiles. To consider 
inequality further we also need to take into account non-labour incomes which include 
remittances from long-term migrants, gifts, subsidies and asset income. We therefore use 
the sample to construct income per capita for each income decile in 1991, 2000 and 
2006. These results are presented in Table 8 and provide some startling evidence on the 













Table 8 Per capita income by decile in 1991, 2000, 2006 in rural China (constant prices)  




















 1991 2000 2006 1991-2000 2000-2006 
1 327 264 371 -2.4 -1.9 5.7 1.9
2 451 427 744 -0.6 -0.7 9.2 5.6
3 584 627 1146 0.8 1.3 10.0 9.1
4 708 858 1554 2.1 4.5 9.9 12.3
5 841 1101 1966 3.0 7.8 9.7 15.2
6 990 1420 2547 4.0 12.9 9.7 19.8
7 1194 1810 3193 4.6 18.5 9.5 24.4
8 1469 2254 4002 4.8 23.6 9.6 30.8
9 1935 3111 5927 5.3 35.3 10.7 49.6
10 4565 7897 13575 6.1 100.0 9.0 100.0
No. of 
households 716 1,036 942 ---- ---- ---- ----
 
Source: CHNS 
Notes: Income is the sum of labour earnings plus assets income, various subsidies, and gifts and remittances 
of relatives and friends. Income per capita is measured in 1991 constant price.  
 
 
The results show that between 1991 and 2000 the real income of the poorest two 
deciles decreased while that of all other deciles increased, with the rate of increase 
uniformly rising as income level increases. This suggests a clearly rising trend in income 
inequality. In the post-2000 period the pattern changes. In this period, all income deciles 
experienced rising real income growth. The average real income growth rate of the 
poorest decile was 5.7 percent per year although this was still lower than that of all other 
deciles, which now experienced similar income growth rates. 
The post-2000 period corresponds to the large shift in labour allocation from 
farm to wage labour, itself a result of the structural transformations induced by 
globalization. More households were able to benefit from the higher incomes provided by 
the expansion wage labour and this was the case for all deciles. In addition, this period is 
also the one in which government policy was particularly active in pursuing redistributive 
policies such as the abolition of the regressive agricultural taxes and investing on 
education and infrastructure in less developed  western regions. This combination of 
globalization and redistributive policies seems to have led to an increase in the average 
real incomes of each income decile although the poorest decile still saw the lowest income 
growth rate, indicating that income inequality worsened although at a slower rate than in 
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the 1991-2000 period. 
 We can also use this income data to analyze poverty rates. As might be expected 
both from national trends and from the data on income provided above, poverty rates in 
the sample show a substantial decline. Table 5 indicates that the poverty rate, defined as a 
purchasing power adjusted dollar a day figure, fell by about a half during the 1991-2006 
period. During the 1991-2000 period, however, the poverty rate was relatively stable and 




Table 9 Per capita income and poverty rate in rural China  







1991 1,110 35.2 716
1993 1,168 36.0 765
1997 1,319 32.0 846
2000 1,387 38.8 1,036
2004 2,820 16.8 988
2006 2,726 18.3 942
Annual rate of growth (%)   
1991-2006 5.2
1991-2000 2.1 ----- ----
2000-2006 9.9 ----- ----
Source: CHNS  
Notes: Income is the sum of labour earnings plus assets income, various subsidies, and gifts and remittances 
of relatives and friends. Poverty rates are calculated based on the $1 a day poverty line. Adjusting the 
purchasing power parity, the dollar a day poverty line is about 700 yuan per person in 1991 constant price. 
The number of households is smaller in this table than that in Table 2 because of missing information on 




 The transformation of the rural economy and the increased reliance on market 
labour has also led to an increase in the percentage of unemployed rural labourers in the 
survey as shown in Table 10. That is, the number of people who no longer have access to 
household farmland – the traditional rural social safety net – has increased with the 










Table 10 Unemployment rates in rural China 








Source: CHNS  





 China’s rural economy has undergone radical change since 1978. The 
dismantling of the commune system and the shift to household farming responding to 
both plan and market forces signaled the start of this change. Since then, liberalization 
and an increasing role for the market have, as in the urban sector, been the consistent 
reform program. Globalization must be seen within this context. That is, the 
globalization of the rural economy has been a part of the general liberalization program 
with accession to the WTO and its attendant price and regulatory effects, a further 
conscious development of this program rather than a purely ‘external’ force. That is, 
‘globalization’ is many ways just another step on the Chinese leadership’s chosen path of 
‘opening up to the outside world’ and market-oriented reform. Nevertheless, it did have a 
direct impact on the rural economy by depressing the relative price of land-intensive 
crops such as grain and encouraging the shift into other crops and earnings activities; at 
the same time, the rise in exports following WTO succession increased the demand for 
migrant labour which the rural areas provided. 
 But just as the pace of ‘opening up’ has been managed by the Chinese policy 
elite so has its effects. The market-oriented reforms, with globalization marking its latest 
phase, have been planned by the leadership through a multitude of policy initiatives. In 
the rural economy, these have included: the move to the household responsibility system; 
the gradual reduction of planned quotas; the initial dual track price system and its 
subsequent abolition; the growth of township and village enterprises and their subsequent 
privatization; and the relaxation of restrictions on migration and the geographical labour 
mobility until China is home to the world’s largest internal migration flows. Indeed, the 
large reallocation of labour which occurred in the rural sector was partly induced by the 
government’s facilitation of increased migration (itself needed to respond to the export 
growth spurred by WTO accession).  
 And yet, at the same time as this progressive unleashing of the market has been 
facilitated and encouraged, the central leadership has also sought to constrain its most 
deleterious social effects. This has been most evident since the early 2000s when the rural 
economy again ranked highly in elite policy priorities and when the current leadership’s 
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goal of building a ‘harmonious society’ is premised on the need to ensure that the rural 
population enjoys the benefits of the rapid growth sustained over three decades. Thus, 
policies to invest heavily in the poorer regions, to abolish  agricultural taxes and fees, to 
increase tenure security and to continue with grain subsidies all point to ways in which 
the central government has sought to manage the markets’ inequalizing tendencies on 
rural inhabitants. In this limited and constrained way, we can see a Polanyian dynamic at 
work at the elite level in China; especially so after 2001 when the rural sector was 
exposed to greater international competition and integration as a result of WTO entry 
and when it became a recipient of increased central government redistributional 
attention. 
 To assess the success of this management of liberalization and globalization we 
have used data from the rural areas of nine provinces from the period 1991 to 2006. This 
data set has the advantage of enabling us to focus on rural trends over a fifteen year time 
period. The transformation of the rural economy is strikingly clear from the data. There 
has been a dramatic shift in labour allocation out of agriculture and into industrial wage 
employment either in rural industry or in the form of rural-urban migration. This trend 
accelerated in the post-2000 period and by 2006, 84 percent of rural households had at 
least one member engaged in wage labour and 41 percent had at least one migrant 
member. Only 13 percent of rural households in the survey relied solely on agriculture 
for employment for its members and 30 percent of households did not farm at all. These 
trends point to the rapid growth of wage employment, the proletarianization of the rural 
labour force including a significant proportion who have no access to land (as shown by 
the rise in open unemployment despite rapid economic growth), and a structural 
transformation of the rural economy. These trends were facilitated by, and followed the 
logic of, market oriented reforms. 
 This structural transformation shifted labour out of relatively low productivity 
agriculture and into higher productivity industrial wage employment. As a result, average 
real earnings grew significantly over the period. Summary measures of income inequality, 
such as the Gini coefficient, indicate that the distribution of rural earnings around this 
rising trend was roughly constant over time. However, more disaggregated data including 
all income sources show that at the bottom end, real incomes decreased over the 
1991-2000 period and that the incomes of the richest income groups grew the fastest. 
Post-2000 the pattern changed with all income groups experiencing real income growth 
with the growth rates being comparable for all income deciles except the poorest which 
continued to lag behind. The post-2000 period witnessed both a more rapid shift into 
wage employment, greater liberalization through WTO-governed integration into the 
global market, and a more concerted effort on the part of the central leadership to address 
the rural economy and raise rural living standards.  
 Given the complexity of processes at work, it is not possible to separate out the 
effects on rural income distribution of global market integration and more aggressive 
government intervention but we can say that the net effect has been positive in terms of 
real earnings growth and poverty reduction but negative in terms of the rise in open 
unemployment, and in terms of in increasing income inequality (although this was 
noticeably more pronounced in the 1991-2000 period than in the 2000-2006 period). 
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 However, the greatest test for managed liberalization is now to come in the wake 
of the global financial crisis and accompanying global recession. The transformation of 
the rural economy to a greater reliance on wage labour served to raise rural real incomes 
while the industrial sector was expanding rapidly. However, this situation has changed 
dramatically in the wake of global recession. Similar to the experience of rural workers 
during the Asian financial crisis but now intensified, many rural enterprises have gone 
bankrupt and rural migrant workers are being sent back to the countryside as a result of 
the export growth slowdown. Official estimates indicate that 26 million rural migrants 
have been sent back from the coastal cities already in he first two months of 2009 
although other estimates are higher still. At any rate, the wage labour boom is now at 
least temporarily ended and rural households now faced the challenge of how to survive 
in its absence. With an increasing rural landless population and increasing numbers of 
unemployed rural labourers, the prospects for social strife are considerably increased. The 
central government has sought to manage liberalization and globalization to date and to 
constrain its negative impacts on economic insecurity and inequality although this has 
still stopped well short of a program of rural social welfare provision. Large scale 
infrastructure spending has been announced to generate employment in the wake of the 
global recession but whether this will be sufficient remains to be seen; economic growth 
has already slowed sharply. The post-reform period has seen China’s leadership manage 
liberalization and globalization in the rural sector and, thousands of local disputes 
notwithstanding, has seen its strategy of elite management prove effective. The latest and 
still unfolding crisis of globalization, however, much more severe and long-lasting than 
the regional crisis of 1997, threatens to create the conditions for the rural ‘counter 
movement from below’ which the leadership has sought so assiduously to prevent from 





1 For a contrary view see, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2004). 
2 See Dong, Song and Zhang (2006) for the challenges facing China’s rural sector under 
WTO.  
3 See Wang (2008) for more extensive discussion of some of the rural social protections 
which are discussed only briefly here.  
4 ‘The Act of Household Registration to Break up the Urban-rural Divide’, Shangwu 
Zhoukan (Business Watch), 2 April 2004, www.businesswatch.com.cn   
5 See Dong (1996) for the feature of China’s land tenure system in the post-reform 
period.   
6 According to the CHNS, each household has an average of 6.5 mu of farmland and 
average net income per mu is 1120 yuan. So the subsidy is about 3.5 percent of the net 
farm income.  Farm income accounts for 44percent of total household income in 
CHNS. 
7 We view the tax reductions as part of the overall policy designed to increase rural 
incomes. However, see Li (2007) for a contrary view, namely, that the tax reductions 
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which raised rural incomes were, in fact, the outcome of complex central-local 
government dynamics and not a coherent and intentional policy to increase rural 
incomes. 
8 Data is from the Agricultural Statistical Yearbook of China, 2006.  
9 The CHNS is jointly sponsored by the Carolina Population Center at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Institute of Nutrition and Food Hygiene of China 
and the Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine. Detailed information about the 
CHNS is available at the website: www.cpc.unc.edu/china/home.html 
10 Urban-rural inequalities are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. The urban:rural 
per capita income ratio is in the region of 3:1 and has been increasing over time. See, for 
example, Lu and Chen (2006) and Knight (2008). The relative income in rural 
households is important and has been a variable attracting policy attention. However, it 
would require a separate paper to analyse this dimension adequately.  
11 The 30 percent of households who report no income from farming consist of those 
who do not have use-rights to land, those who lease land to others and those who use 
land for non-agricultural purposes. We are unable to ascertain the proportions in each 
category from the data set. We do, however, report figures on open unemployment in 
Table 10 which would largely be drawn from populations in the first category, i.e. those 
that have no access to land. 
12 The data reported in Table 2 and subsequent earnings Tables exclude household 
members who were long-term migrants and hence not reporting their activities and 
earnings in the survey. The activities and earnings of short-term migrants who were still 
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